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 Abstract 
We find that stock returns are driven, at least in part, by open market share repurchases 
by the firm. We also find that the amount of open market repurchases can be predicted, at least in 
part, by the pre-repurchase stock performance. Further analysis reveals that post-announcement 
return anomalies are more significant for firms that follow their announcements by conducting 
actual repurchases during the four quarters following the announcement quarter. In addition, the 
amount of shares repurchased is a better predictor of returns for firms that announce only once 
within one year. 
 
Keywords:  Actual Repurchases; Abnormal Returns 
JEL Classification: G30, G35  
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 1: Introduction 
Recent studies show that share repurchases as an alternative to dividend payments play 
an increasingly important role in corporate payout policy. U.S. corporations used more cash to 
repurchase shares than to pay dividends since 1998 (Grullon and Ikenberry 2000).  Furthermore, 
as mentioned by Banyi, Dyl and Kahle (2008), many researchers (Fenn and Liang 2001; Guay 
and Harford 2000; Grullon and Michaely 2002; Kahle 2002) start to explore the consequences of 
firms’ replacing dividends by open market repurchases and the stock performance anomalies 
triggered by repurchase announcements.  
The purpose of our paper is to find whether corporate repurchase information is useful to 
equity investors. We find few study on the direct relationship between stock returns and 
repurchases in the literature. Thus, our research makes a contribution to investors, corporate 
managers, and academics who want to study the ability of actual repurchases to predict stock 
returns or vice versa. 
Current studies focus on either the announcement anomalies (Peyer and Vermaelen 2009; 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995) or the accounting performance improvements 
(Grullon and Michaely 2004; Lie 2005; Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008), rather than the long-term 
predictability of post-announcement stock returns. Only one study, Cook, Krigman, and Leach 
(2004), investigates the relationship between daily stock returns and daily repurchases. Its focus, 
however, is not on the return predictability, but rather is on the liquidity and repurchase timing. 
Lie (2005) differentiates firms that actually buy back shares after open market repurchase 
announcements from those that do not. He finds better operating performance is associated with 
significant actual repurchase activities, and not announcements per se. Gong, Louis, and Sun 
(2008) also find endogenous association between the actual repurchase amount and earnings 
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 management. Those findings imply a possible inner link between the actual repurchase amounts 
and stock abnormal returns. We conjecture that the stock performance in the post-repurchase 
period is also likely to be driven by the actual repurchase activities. We posit that the greater the 
company’s buyback, the better its stock performance will be. Consistent with our conjecture, we 
find a significant positive relationship between the amounts of open market share repurchases and 
future stock returns. We also conjecture that the undervaluation of the stock provides an incentive 
to buybacks. Consistent with our conjecture, we find a negative correlation between the 
repurchase amount and the preceding stock performance. This finding is consistent with the 
Traditional Signalling Hypothesis (TSH) (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995).   
As a first step, we examine quarterly stock performance around the time of the 
repurchase announcement quarter to determine the market reaction in the prior and post 
announcement quarters, using a much larger and more recent sample of 5114 open market 
repurchase events from 1996 to 2006. We find evidence of a significant negative average stock 
abnormal return in the quarter prior to the announcement and the announcement quarter, while 
the negative significance disappears in the four quarters after the announcement.  Thus, we 
conclude that, in contrast to the findings reported by Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), the market 
may not show an immediate positive reaction to firms’ repurchase activities; however, the stock 
performance has a potential to out-perform in the long run. 
In spite of the average pessimistic market reaction mentioned above, we test the 
association between stock returns and companies’ actual repurchase amount (as a percentage of 
total shares outstanding). We find that stock abnormal returns in the current quarter are positively 
related to the actual repurchase amount in the previous quarter. This finding would enable 
investors to predict future stock performance based on the observed actual repurchase amount in 
the current quarter. In addition, we analyze the relationship between the actual repurchase amount 
in the current quarter and the stock performance in the previous quarter, and find that the 
repurchase amount in the current quarter is affected by the preceding abnormal performance of 
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 the stock.  Lastly, as a robustness check, we form two subsamples; one consists of companies 
with positive actual repurchases during the repurchase announcement quarter and the four 
subsequent quarters, and the other is formed by companies that do not make additional repurchase 
announcements during the one year after the announcement date. Consistent with our conjecture, 
we find that the significance between the abnormal return in the post-announcement period and 
the actual repurchase amount in the prior quarter is not driven by the non-repurchases and 
repeated-announcement events. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides the 
overview of the literature and our choice of abnormal return measurement. Section 3 describes 
the sample selection procedure. Section 4 discusses measurement of variables. Section 5 
investigates whether stock abnormal performance can be predicted with actual repurchase 
activities. Section 6 analyzes the evidence on the association between stock returns and future 
repurchase amounts. Section 7 provides the results for the two subsamples mentioned above. The 
study concludes in section 8.   
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 2: Literature Review 
During the past 20 years, the market has witnessed a dramatic increase in corporate share 
buyback activities. Open market share repurchases have become the most common way to 
repurchase shares (Berk and Demarzo 2009). The other two important ways of repurchasing 
shares are tender offers, Dutch auctions, and targeted repurchases.  From 1985 to 2004, totalling 
$1.8 trillion, 89% of the total share repurchases value (Banyi, Dyl and Kahle 2008) was 
performed through open market repurchases. Numerous studies offer plausible reasons for why 
firms execute open market repurchase. The most popular hypothesis is signalling, which means 
repurchases signal managers’ information to the market (Berk and Demarzo 2009). Other 
potential explanations for repurchases include: solving the agency problem, reorganizing the 
firm’s capital structure (Baker, Powell and Veit 2003), achieving finer financial leverage (Dittmar 
2000) and countering diluting effects of employee and management stock options (Fenn and 
Liang 1997).   
Many academic researchers report that stock abnormal returns depend on the open market 
repurchase activities. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) report that the average 
abnormal four-year buy-and-hold return, after the initial announcement is 12.1%, using a sample 
of 1239 announcement events from 1980 to 1990.  
Grullon and Michaely (2004) find a significant predicting power of accounting variables 
towards the post-announcement price drift both in the short run and in the long run. Lie (2005) 
states that markets might under-react to embedded information in the repurchase announcement 
as investors may still have doubts about the credibility of the repurchase information, thus the 
stock market will not immediately respond to the repurchase information until it confirms that the 
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 actual repurchase activity from the company’s earnings report. Lie then shifts the emphasis on 
stock abnormal returns around post-repurchase earnings announcement.  
Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) also find positive and significant long-term abnormal 
returns following open market repurchase announcements. They use a sample of 1720 firms that 
execute actual repurchases in the announcement quarter or in the subsequent quarter, from 1984 
to 2002.  
Cook, Krigman, and Leach (2004) study the direct relationship between daily stock 
returns and daily repurchases on a unique sample of 64 repurchasing firms and find that daily 
abnormal returns are associated with companies’ subsequent daily repurchase activity. However, 
that study has been constrained by the data availability in the U.S., since companies are obligated 
to publish only quarterly repurchase activities. Its results contribute primarily to the market 
microstructure literature, rather than the long-term return predictability. 
 
2.1 Methodology of Measuring Long-term Abnormal Returns 
Traditional measurements, like the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Fama–French 
three-factor model, or more recently Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, are widely adopted for 
calculating abnormal returns. In these approaches, inferences about the abnormal return are based 
on estimating alpha from a multifactor time-series regression and its statistical significance. 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) point out that since these time-series regressions weight each period 
equally, they have lower power to detect abnormal performance if managers time corporate 
events to coincide with misevaluations. In addition, CAPM, Fama–French (1993) three-factor 
model and Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model are based on a general factor model which lead to a 
reasonable suspicion that those risk factors (i.e. SMB) do not fully compensate for risk.  
Researchers have sought to improve the measurement of long-term abnormal returns 
from various perspectives. Characteristic-based matching approach is considered as a finer 
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 alternative to those traditional measurements.  This approach requires one to match an event firm 
with a non-event firm who has similar characteristics or share the same quintiles. In this paper, 
we follow Daniel et al. (1997) who refer to four types of comparison groups: Two-digit matched, 
four-digit matched, sized-matched and performance matched, based on the firms’ Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
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 3: Sample Selection 
We acquire the full sample of open market repurchase announcements from the Security 
Data Company’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database and combine it with data from 
Compustat and the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases. We then set the 
sample time range to be from 1996 to the first half of 2006 and contain 5,293 open market share 
repurchase announcements in our sample. We exclude 61 announcements with unavailable 
announcement amounts because we cannot determine how much the firms planned to repurchase 
relative to how much they did repurchase based on Compustat. For the 5,232 events that have 
been identified, we estimate the value of actual repurchases in a given quarter based on 
Compustat quarterly year-to-date data item “PRSTKCY- purchase of common and preferred 
stock” and normalize it by firms’ market value of equity. Since the actual repurchase data is 
quarterly, we require that each firm can only have one announcement event in each fiscal quarter. 
By doing so, we further exclude 118 announcements. The final sample includes 5,114 open 
market repurchase announcements. 
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 4: Variables Measurement 
4.1 Actual Repurchase 
Our research relies on the accurate measurement of the number of shares actually bought 
back by the announcing firms. However, a precise measurement of actual repurchase amount is 
not readily available. Our repurchase proxy, Compustat data item “purchase of preferred and 
common stock-PRSTKCY” is an aggregation of many other types of security transactions besides 
open market share repurchases, and this may potentially cause overestimation of share 
repurchases. In spite of that, PRSTKCY is by far the most common measure of the quarterly 
actual repurchase dollar amounts (Stephens and Weisbach 1998; Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008).  
Table 1 reports announcement statistics for the open market repurchase sample. The most 
observations occur in 1998 with 906 events, followed by 1999 with 776 events, which is 
consistent with the findings of Peyer and Vermaelen (2008). All the statistics are based on the full 
sample of 5,114 open market repurchase announcements that occurred between 1996 to the first 
half of 2006. “Number of events” indicates the number of announcements in each calendar year 
or in each quarter. 
4.2 Stock Performance 
Our first task is to investigate whether there are long-run abnormal returns after the 
announcement of open market repurchases. Following Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008), we compute 
quarterly abnormal returns for announcing firms using Daniel et al. (1997)’s portfolio-matching 
measure. This portfolio-matching measure assumes that announcing firms differ from the other 
similar non-announcing only in that they have experienced the event, and as a result, the return 
difference between announcing firms and non-announcing portfolios is the abnormal return. This 
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 measure uses the return of a universe portfolio of stocks as the benchmark return that is matched 
to the announcing firm’s raw returns each quarter based on the dimensions of size (market value 
of equity) and book-to-market ratio. Fama-French’s 25 portfolios formed on size and book-to-
market obtained from Kenneth French’s website are used here as the benchmark portfolios. These 
25 portfolios are constructed monthly from 1996 to 2006 and are the intersections of five 
portfolios formed on firm size and five portfolios built on book to market ratio. Quarterly return 
of the benchmark portfolio is then calculated based on the monthly return of each of the 25 
portfolios. With the size and book-to-market ratio breakpoints already available from Kenneth 
French’s website, we assign each event firm to one of the 25 benchmark portfolios according to 
its size and book-to-market ratio rank in each quarter. The quarterly abnormal returns are 
calculated as the raw return minus the benchmark portfolio return.  
Table 2 presents the abnormal return mean and median statistics for each of the five 
quarters around open market announcement, excluding return outliers on both sides.  
In the repurchase announcement quarter (quarter 0) and the prior quarter (quarter -1), 
returns are significantly negative. The possible explanations could be the market under-reaction 
hypothesis (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen 1995; Lie 2005), that markets cannot fully 
capture the information conveyed from repurchases announcements. Comment and Jarrel (1991) 
point out the firms tend to announce open market repurchase programs following a decline in 
their share price, when their stock is more likely to be undervalued.  However, what is not 
expected in our research is the quarterly abnormal returns for the post announcement quarters 1, 
2, and 3 are also negative, although the t-tests do not show a great significance. This suggests that 
instead of excelling their industry peers, the announcing firms, on average, even fail to perform 
better.  
This result, to some extent, is inconsistent with the literature that reports robust long-term 
abnormal returns in the post-announcement period (Gong, Louis, and Sun 2008; Peryer and 
Vermaelen 2008). Possible explanations could be our method of choice to calculate quarterly 
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 return instead of monthly return and the different way of selecting samples. We did not use the 
Fama-French (1993) three-factor model combined with Ibbotson’s RATS method adopted by 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2008) who did find persistent long-term anomalies in the post-
announcement period. Gong, Louis, and Sun (2008) arrive at a similar conclusion as Peryer and 
Vermaelen (2008), but apply different processes in selecting repurchase events (only companies 
which did actual repurchases within the announcement quarter or the subsequent quarter remain).  
Findings in Lie (2005) can provide another explanation for our result, as he indicates that 
stock investors will not be fully informed of the company’s repurchase activity until the post-
repurchase earnings announcement date, thus we may not observe robust anomalies in subsequent 
announcement quarters. From the third and fourth quarter following the announcement quarter, 
the negative abnormal return begins to lose significance, which to certain extent implies a stock 
performance improvement of the abnormal returns after the repurchase announcement.  
4.3 Control Variables 
Since previous studies have shown that firm size is a significant factor in explaining 
abnormal returns and small firms tend to have higher abnormal returns on average, we include 
firm size as a factor in all our regressions. The firm size factor is obtained by taking the log of the 
total book value of assets (Compustat quarterly data item ATQ). Earnings per share (EPS, 
Compustat item OPEPSQ) is used to proxy a company’s operating performance, and firms with 
higher earnings per share are more likely to expect a higher return. Price earnings ratio (P/E) is 
applied to measure whether the stock is over- or under-valued (Berk and Demarzo 2009), as a 
lower price earnings ratio is more likely to expect a higher abnormal return.  
In addition, we control for the effect of interest rate changes because expected stock 
returns are believed to be systematically related to market risk and interest rate. Our Interest rate 
quarterly change is calculated based on the differencing of quarterly 3-month T-bill rates. The 
quarter 3-month T-bill rate is the average monthly rate of the relative fiscal quarter of each event 
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 firm. We obtain monthly 3-month T-bill rates from the Federal Reserve Statistical Release 
website. 
In order to explain actual repurchases, we adopt cash, leverage ratio, and size as controls 
in our models. Cash, (Compustat year-to-date item OANCFY), deflated by market value of 
equity,  is the operating cash flow in the previous quarter, and as Lie (2000) points out, 
repurchase-increasing firms have more excess cash than their peers do in the industry. Leverage 
ratio (Lev) is long-term debt (Compustat item: DLTTQ) plus debt in current liabilities 
(Compustat item: DLCQ) divided by total assets (Compustat item: ATQ). Size is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s total assets. We also use Tobin’s Q, the market value of equity plus the book 
value of debt scaled by the book value of assets, to represent the firm’s investment opportunity 
(Lie 2000; Grullon and Michaely 2002). 
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 5: The Relation between Actual Repurchase and Subsequent 
Quarter’s Abnormal Return 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) find that open market share repurchase 
announcements are followed by long-run firm abnormal performance during 1980 - 1990. Lie 
(2005) points out that open market repurchase announcements lead to operating performance 
improvement following the announcement, and this improvement is more significant for firms 
that have actually repurchased shares after the repurchase announcement. In Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelen’s  (1995) research of post-announcement abnormal returns, they do 
not take actual repurchase into consideration and only relate abnormal return with repurchase 
announcement events. Lie (2005) considers actual repurchase as a factor for explaining post-
announcement firm performance, but his focus is on the accounting measure “operating 
performance” instead of the capital market responses. Inspired by Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and 
Vermaelen (1995) and Lie (2005), we are curious whether there exists a relation between actual 
repurchase and subsequent abnormal return, or in other words, whether actual repurchase predicts 
post-repurchase abnormal return. As a result, we model abnormal returns as a function of the 
share repurchased amount (the open market repurchase dollar amount normalized by the firm’s 
market value of equity) and several other control variables. Our choice of control variables is 
 b  ussiguided y the prior disc on. 
ܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܲ/ܧ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܧܲ ௜ܵ
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܫ݊ݐ. ݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ,                                                                 (1) 
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 where i is the announcement event, j is the quarter after the announcement1, j= -1, …, 4. 
Rep (j-1) is the percentage of shares outstanding repurchased in the previous quarter, 
AbRet (j-1) is the quarterly abnormal return for the previous quarter, EPS (j-1) is the 
earnings per share in the previous quarter, P/E (j) is the ratio of current quarter’s stock 
price scaled by previous quarter’s EPS, and Interest rate change (j-1) is the change in 
quarterly 3-month T-bill rates. 
If the amount of share repurchase by firms can really predict abnormal return in the 
subsequent quarter, we expect the coefficient on Repurchase (j-1), α1, to be significantly positive.   
We use clustering (by firm and Fama-French 22 industries) to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and also include year dummies in our regression. The regression is cross-
sectional. It should be noted that the results remain unchanged if we cluster by firm and year. 
 Table 4 contains results of the regression of the post-repurchase quarterly abnormal 
return on the fraction of shares the firm actually repurchases. In Quarter 1, which is the first 
quarter after the announcement quarter, the coefficient on the previous quarter’s repurchases 
(0.2742) is positive and significantly different from zero. For the subsequent quarters, Quarters 2 
and 3, we also see significantly positive coefficients on the previous quarter’s repurchases. The 
coefficient loses its significance in Quarter 4, and we believe it is because the repurchase 
signalling effect is gradually disappearing when the repurchasing time point becomes more and 
more far away from the initial repurchase announcement date, and the market has fully 
incorporated all favourable information provided by the repurchase announcement and 
subsequent repurchases. Overall, the evidence strongly suggests that the proportion of the shares 
outstanding that firm repurchases is a significant determinant of post-repurchase abnormal 
returns. 
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1 For example ܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜଴ is the abnormal return of event i in the announcement quarter. 
 6: The Relation between Actual Repurchase and Previous 
Quarter’s Abnormal Return 
Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991) both conclude that repurchase 
announcements signal positive information about firm value. The firms themselves, who usually 
cite undervaluation as the primary motivation for the repurchase, support the signalling 
hypothesis. According to the survey evidence in Brav et al. (2003), managers regard 
undervaluation of the stock to be the most important reason for repurchasing shares. If the stock 
is truly undervalued, share repurchase programs represent positive NPV projects that benefit 
shareholders. We ask the following questions: does the signalling hypothesis apply to actual share 
repurchase and do managers time the actual repurchases when they believe their firm’s stock is 
undervalued? In order to answer these two questions, we estimate the following model2: 
  
ܴ݁݌௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܥܽݏ݄௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܮ݁ݒ௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ଺ܵ݅ݖ݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ             ሺ2ሻ 
 
In Model (2), AbRet (j-1) is the quarterly abnormal return for the previous quarter. Rep (j-1) is 
the percentage of shares outstanding repurchased in the previous quarter. Cash (j-1) is the balance 
of cash from operating in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Tobin’s Q (j-1) is the 
market-to-book ratio in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Lev (j-1) is the ratio of 
debt to market value of equity in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Lev also 
explains repurchases to a certain extent because many managers borrow funds to buy back firm’s 
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2 In Model (1) and Model (2), i is the announcement event, j is the quarter after the announcement, j= -1, 0, 
1, 2, 3, 4. For example ܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜଴ is the abnormal return of event i in the announcement quarter. 
 shares. Size (j-1) is the log of the value of total assets in the quarter before the actual repurchase 
quarter. Since previous studies have shown that firm size is a significant factor in explaining 
abnormal returns and small firms tend to have higher abnormal returns on average, we include 
size in our regression. The regression is cross-sectional, and we use clustering (firm and Fama-
French 22 industry) to correct heteroskedasticity and also include year dummies in our regression. 
The results have no significant difference when we clustered using firm and year. 
Results reported in Table 5 provide evidence that the proportion of shares repurchased is 
determined by the level of the previous quarter’s abnormal return. The regression results indicate 
that there is a significantly negative association between abnormal returns and subsequent 
repurchases in Quarters 2 and 3 after the announcement. However, in Quarters 0, 1 and 4, the 
regression provides no evidence that low abnormal returns lead to higher level of actual 
repurchases. 
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 7: Subsamples and Robustness Checks 
Open market programs usually last for several months or even years. In practice, not all 
announcements lead to actual repurchases. Lie (2005) defines a carry-through repurchase 
announcement as an announcement followed by actual share repurchase during the fiscal quarter 
of the announcement and/or the subsequent quarter. We adjust Lie’s (2005) definition and extend 
the carry-through period from two quarters to five quarters including the announcement quarter in 
Model (2) and four quarters following the announcement quarter in Model (1). In the carry-
though subsample, we exclude all announcements that end with no shares repurchased in the 
announcement quarter and subsequent four quarters, and the sample is reduced to approximately 
3800 announcement observations. Then we replicate the regression analysis for this carry-through 
subsample. Without zero-repurchase announcements, we expect to see the coefficient on 
Repurchase (j-1), α1, to be greater, in other words, a more significant positive relation between 
abnormal returns and the actual repurchases in the previous quarter. Table 6 presents the results. 
In Quarter 3, the coefficient on Repurchase (j-1) is 1.0830, and it is positive at a higher 
confidence level (1%) than that for the full sample (5%). We also find a significant predictive 
relation between repurchases and stock returns in Quarter 4 in the subsample. All coefficients on 
the Repurchase variable approximately double in magnitude in the subsample of repurchasing 
firms relative to the full sample. Consistent with our expectation, we find a more significantly 
positive relation between abnormal returns and previous quarter’s proportion of shares 
repurchased. 
Table 7 reports the result of Model (2) for the carry-through subsample. The only 
significantly negative coefficient on the previous quarter’s abnormal return appears in Q2, Q3 and 
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 Q4. In other two quarters, the coefficients on previous quarter’s abnormal return show no 
significance at all. 
Our second subsample is designed to include only one announcement for each firm from 
Q0 to Q4. The purpose of this subsample is to mitigate confusion if actual repurchases from the 
initial announcement overlap with subsequent announcements in the four-quarter window after 
the initial announcement. Then we repeat the same analyses that have been done to the full 
sample and the carry-through subsample. Table 8 and 9 report the estimation results of Model (1) 
and Model (2) for the subsample without repeated announcements in the announcement quarter 
and the following four quarters.  
In Table 8, the results of the post-repurchase quarterly abnormal return on the fraction of 
shares the firm actually repurchases further prove our hypothesis that the proportion of the shares 
outstanding the firm repurchases is a significant determinant of post-repurchase abnormal returns. 
In Q1 and Q3, the coefficients on the previous quarter’s repurchases are positive and significantly 
different from zero. The coefficient loses its significance in Q4 for the same reason we have 
stated in the full sample section. 
Table 9 presents estimation results of Model (2) for this subsample. The results are 
similar to those of the full sample. In Q2 and Q3, there are significantly negative coefficients on 
previous quarter’s repurchase, meaning that firms time their actual repurchase actions to take 
advantage of periods when their equity is more undervalued by the market. In Q0, Q1 and Q4, the 
coefficients are not significantly different from zero. 
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 8: Conclusion 
Earlier studies report that accounting performance improvement is associated with actual 
open market repurchases. The empirical evidence provided in this paper indicates that the stock 
performance of firms engaged in share repurchase activity can be predicted by actual open market 
repurchases or vice versa. These results have important implications for investors, in that firms’ 
actual repurchases activities can at least partially contribute to future stock performance. In 
addition, our results indicate that the undervaluation of the stock, to a certain extent, is an 
important explanatory factor to firms’ actual repurchase activities. 
Several extensions to this study may be suggested. Our paper only reveals the 
dependencies between current actual repurchase amount and future stock performance or vice 
versa, while there can be an endogenous dependence between actual repurchases and stock 
performance. The issue is which of the two economic variables plays the dominant or causal role, 
and whether the actual repurchases lead stock performance or vice versa. To solve this problem, 
we could apply a simultaneous equation model to get a closer look. 
The issue of measuring actual repurchase amount has also been mentioned in our paper. 
Currently, researchers acquire actual open market repurchase information from Compustat and 
CRSP. However, Banyi, Dyl and Kahle (2008) question the accuracy of the estimations of open 
market actual repurchases amount reported from those data sources. In order to obtain a more 
reliable result, we would use a finer approach to assess the actual amount of the open market 
repurchase and retest our results. As noted earlier, we could choose the portfolio matching 
procedure advocated by Barber and Lyon (1997) to measure stock performance. 
 18
 Overall, this paper went beyond the effects of the repurchase announcements per se on 
stock returns. It has made the first step to explore the anomalies in stock returns triggered by 
actual open market repurchases and reveal relationship between the two. 
 19
 Appendix 
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 Table 1 
Open Market Share Repurchase Announcement Sample Distribution 
Distribution of the sample of share repurchases program announcements by the year of the 
announcement. The sample only includes open market repurchase programs. Tender-offer and 
Dutch auction repurchase programs are excluded from the sample.  
 
Calendar Year/ Quarter Number of Events 
1996 630 
1997 658 
1998 906 
1999 776 
2000 695 
2001 343 
2002 341 
2003 223 
2004 299 
2005 197 
The first half of 2006                                46 
Total                                5114 
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 Table 2.1 
Long-term Abnormal Returns around Open Market Repurchase Announcements 
Table 2 reports quarterly abnormal returns for each of the five quarters around the open market 
announcement quarter. Quarter 0 is the fiscal quarter of the share repurchase announcement. 
Abnormal returns for the announcing firms in each quarter are calculated using Daniel et al. 
(1997) portfolio-matching procedure. For each of the five quarters, the abnormal return mean is 
the simple average of all the available quarterly abnormal returns. N is the number of 
observations. A two-sided t-test and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test are conducted for the mean 
and median, respectively. For the abnormal return mean and median, significance at the 10% (*), 
5% (**), and 1% (***) levels is provided.  
 
Quarter   N   Mean   Median Max   Min StdDev 
-1 5114 -0.0478*** -0.0448*** 0.6005 -1.0398 0.2043 
 0 5114 -0.0292*** -0.0293*** 0.7442 -0.8973 0.2257 
 1 5114 -0.0047 -0.0152*** 0.7532 -1.0739 0.2159 
 2 5114 -0.0007 -0.0105*** 0.7907 -0.8435 0.2203 
 3 5114 -0.0029 -0.0153*** 0.8485 -0.9937 0.2268 
 4 5114   0.0001 -0.0153*** 0.8482 -0.8757 0.2262 
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 Table 2.2 
Quarterly Open Market Actual Repurchase Amount as Percentage of Market Value 
This table reports the open market actual repurchase amount in each event quarter. The actual 
repurchase amount is calculated by the open market repurchase dollar amount (Compustat item: 
PRSTKCY) normalized by the firm’s market value of equity. 
 
Quarter N Mean Median Max StdDev 
-1 5114 0.0070 0.0000 0.0827 0.0146 
0 5114 0.0118 0.0035 0.1064 0.0193 
1 5114 0.0099 0.0023 0.0971 0.0171 
2 5114 0.0079 0.0001 0.0970 0.0159 
3 5114 0.0066 0.0000 0.0897 0.0142 
4 5114 0.0060 0.0000 0.0824 0.0133 
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 Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Other Explaining Variables  
Descriptive statistics for the sample of firms that announced open market repurchase programs 
between 1996 and 2006. All financial data are measured at the end of the fiscal quarter of the 
announcement. 
Size is the log of the value of total assets. Lev is long-term debt and debt in current liabilities 
scaled by the book value of assets. Cash is cash from operating. EPS is earnings per share from 
operating. P/E ratio is the quarterly stock price scaled by previous quarter’s EPS. Tobin’s Q is the 
market value of assets scaled by the book value of assets. The Interest rate change is the change 
in the quarterly 3-month T-bill rates. N is the number of observations. 
 
 N Mean Median Max Min StdDev 
Size 5114  6.19  6.14  12.00   2.09  2.13 
Lev 5114  0.65  0.22  6.90   0.00  1.13 
Cash 5114  57.99  2.00  1558 -151.31  213.84 
EPS 5114  0.32  0.27  2.16 -0.61  0.45 
P/E  5114  49.82  53.15  529 -292.41  115.54 
Tobin’s Q 5114  1.34  1.04  6.90  0.67  1.01 
Int. change 5114 -0.02  0.00  0.53 -1.26  0.37 
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 Table 4 
The Relation between Actual Repurchase and Subsequent Quarter’s Abnormal Return 
The dependent variables are quarterly abnormal returns in fiscal quarters one through four (Q1-
Q4) following the announcement quarter. Rep (j-1) is the percentage of shares outstanding 
repurchased in the previous quarter. AbRet (j-1) is the quarterly abnormal return for the previous 
quarter. EPS (j-1) is the earnings per share in the previous quarter. P/E (j) is the ratio of current 
quarter’s stock price scaled by previous quarter’s EPS. Interest rate change (j-1) is the change in 
quarterly 3-month T-bill rates. N is the number of observations. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% 
(**), and 1% (***) levels is provided. The significance tests are based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm and industry levels.  
 
 Q1  Q2 Q3  Q4 
ܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܲ/ܧ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܧܲ ௜ܵ
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܫ݊ݐ. ݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ                                                                                                                      
Rep (j-1) 0.2742** 0.5442***  0.4793** 0.1969 
AbRet(j-1) 0.1274*** 0.0939***  0.1517***  0.1707*** 
P/E ratio(j) 0.0002*** 0.0002***  0.0002***  0.0003*** 
EPS(j-1) 0.0724*** 0.0928***  0.1045***  0.1037*** 
Interest rate change(j-1) 0.0014*** -0.0283***  0.0317*** -0.0517*** 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 5114 5114 5114 5114 
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 Table 5 
The Relation between Actual repurchase and Previous Quarter’s Abnormal Return 
The dependent variables are the percentages of shares outstanding repurchased in the fiscal 
quarter of the announcement and quarters one through four (Q1-Q4) following the announcement. 
AbRet (j-1) is the quarterly abnormal return for the previous quarter. Rep (j-1) is the percentage 
of shares outstanding repurchased in the previous quarter. Cash (j-1) is the balance of cash from 
operating in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Tobin’s Q (j-1) is the market value 
of assets scaled by the book value of assets in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. 
Lev (j-1) is the ratio of debt to market value of equity in the quarter before the actual repurchase 
quarter. Size (j-1) is the log of the value of total assets in the quarter before the actual repurchase 
quarter. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels is provided. The significance 
tests are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm 
and industry levels.  
 
   Q0   Q1   Q2   Q3    Q4 
ܴ݁݌௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܥܽݏ݄௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܮ݁ݒ௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ଺ܵ݅ݖ݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ                                                                                              
AbRet(j-1)  -0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0023*** -0.0024*** -0.0012 
Rep(j-1)  0.4159***  0.2263***  0.2826***  0.2315***  0.2720*** 
Cash(j-1)  0.0302***  0.0199***  0.0120***  0.0164***  0.0118*** 
Tobin’s Q(j-1) -0.0001  0.0000  0.0002  0.0002  0.0004** 
Lev(j-1) -0.0006* -0.0006** -0.0005*** -0.0003  -0.0000 
Size(j-1) -0.0003**  0.0001  0.0002*  0.0002**  0.0001 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
 
5114 
 
5114 
 
5114 
 
5114 
 
5114 
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 Table 6 
The Relation between Actual Repurchases and Subsequent Quarter’s Abnormal Returns, 
Excluding Announcements with No Shares Actually Repurchased 
The dependent variables are quarterly abnormal returns in fiscal quarters one through four (Q1-
Q4) following the announcement quarter. The sample excludes announcements with no shares 
actually repurchased in the announcement quarter and four quarters following the announcement 
quarter. Rep (j-1) is the percentage of shares outstanding repurchased in the previous quarter. 
AbRet (j-1) is the quarterly abnormal return for the previous quarter. EPS (j-1) is the earning per 
share in the previous quarter. P/E (j) is the ratio of current quarter’s stock price scaled by previous 
quarter’s EPS. Interest rate change (j-1) is the change in quarterly 3-month T-bill rates. 
Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels is provided. The significance tests are 
based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm and 
industry levels.  
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
ܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܲ/ܧ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܧܲ ௜ܵ
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܫ݊ݐ. ݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ                                                                                                                    
Rep(j-1) 0.5187**  1.2359*** 1.0830***  1.2662*** 
AbRet(j-1) 0.1410***  0.1860*** 0.2329***  0.2575*** 
P/E ratio(j) 0.0000  0.0000 0.0001***  0.0001*** 
EPS(j-1) 0.0676***  0.0948*** 0.1076***  0.0935*** 
Interest rate change(j-1) 0.0317 -0.0365** 0.0317*** -0.0004 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 3814 3819 3816 3810 
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 Table 7 
The Relation between Actual Repurchases and Previous Quarter’s Abnormal Returns, 
Excluding Announcements with No Shares Actually Repurchased 
The dependent variables are the percentages of shares outstanding repurchased in the fiscal 
quarter of the announcement and quarters one through four (Q1-Q4) following the announcement. 
The sample excludes announcements with no shares actually repurchased in the announcement 
quarter and four quarters following the announcement quarter. AbRet (j-1) is the quarterly 
abnormal return for the previous quarter. Rep (j-1) is the percentage of shares outstanding 
repurchased in the previous quarter. Cash (j-1) is the balance of cash from operating in the quarter 
before the actual repurchase quarter. Tobin’s Q (j-1) is the market value of assets scaled by the 
book value of assets in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Lev (j-1) is the ratio of 
debt to market value of equity in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Size (j-1) is the 
log of the value of total assets in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Significance at 
the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels is provided. The significance tests are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm and industry 
levels.  
 
Q0 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
ܴ݁݌௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܥܽݏ݄௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܮ݁ݒ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙ଺ܵ݅ݖ݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ                                                                                                                      
AbRet(j-1)  0.0001 -0.0019 -0.0035***  -0.0027*** -0.0014* 
Rep(j-1)  0.3464***  0.1484***  0.2268***  0.1898*** 0.2310*** 
Cash(j-1) 0.0159*** 0.0128*** 0.0048 0.0140*** 0.0104*** 
Tobin’s Q(j-1) -0.0010*** -0.0008*** -0.0003* -0.0003 -0.0000 
Lev(j-1)  0.0010** 0.0005  0.0009  0.0003 0.0004 
Size(j-1) -0.0003**  0.0001  0.0002*  0.0003*** 0.0002* 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
  
3814 3812 3819 3816 3810 
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 Table 8 
The Relation between Actual Repurchase and Subsequent Quarter’s Abnormal Return, 
Excluding Repeated Announcements 
The dependent variables are quarterly abnormal returns in fiscal quarters one through four (Q1-
Q4) following the announcement quarter. The sample includes only repurchase announcements 
by firms that do not make another announcement during four fiscal quarters following the 
announcement quarter. Repurchase (j-1) is the percentage of shares outstanding repurchased in 
the previous quarter. Abnormal return (j-1) is the quarterly abnormal return for the previous 
quarter. EPS (j-1) is the earning per share in the previous quarter. P/E (j) is the ratio of current 
quarter’s stock price scaled by previous quarter’s EPS. Interest rate change (j-1) is the change in 
quarterly 3-month T-bill rates. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels is 
provided. The significance tests are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
adjusted for clustering at the firm and industry levels.  
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
ܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܲ/ܧ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܧܲ ௜ܵ
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܫ݊ݐ. ݄ܿܽ݊݃݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ                                                                                                                   
Repurchase(j-1) 0.8536***  0.4328* 1.0226***  0.3025 
Abnormal return(j-1) 0.1082***  0.0659*** 0.1198***  0.1562*** 
P/E ratio(j) 0.0002***  0.0003*** 0.0002***  0.0003*** 
EPS(j-1) 0.0953***  0.1073*** 0.1270***  0.1176*** 
Interest rate change(j-1) 0.0234 -0.0608** 0.0286 -0.1040 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 2234 2234 2234 2234 
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 Table 9 
The Relation between Actual Repurchases and Previous Quarter’s Abnormal Returns, 
Excluding Repeated Announcements 
The dependent variables are the percentages of shares outstanding repurchased in the fiscal 
quarter of the announcement and quarters one through four (Q1-Q4) following the announcement. 
The sample includes only repurchase announcements by firms that do not make another 
announcement during four fiscal quarters following the announcement quarter. AbRet (j-1) is the 
quarterly abnormal return for the previous quarter. Rep (j-1) is the percentage of shares 
outstanding repurchased in the previous quarter. Cash (j-1) is the balance of cash from operating 
in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Tobin’s Q (j-1) is the market value of assets 
scaled by the book value of assets in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Lev (j-1) is 
the ratio of debt to market value of equity in the quarter before the actual repurchase quarter. Lev 
also explains repurchases to a certain extent because many managers borrow funds to buy back 
firm’s shares. Size (j-1) is the log of the value of total assets in the quarter before the actual 
repurchase quarter. Significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels is provided. The 
significance tests are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for 
clustering at the firm and industry levels.  
 
Q0 1 Q2 Q  QQ 3 4 
ܴ݁݌௜
௝ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵܣܾܴ݁ݐ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܴ݁݌௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܥܽݏ݄௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙସܶ݋ܾ݅݊ᇱݏܳ௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙହܮ݁ݒ௜
௝ିଵ ൅
ߙ଺ܵ݅ݖ݁௜
௝ିଵ ൅ ߙ௡ݕ݁ܽݎ ݀ݑ݉݉ݕ                                                                                              
AbRet(j-1)  -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0023** -0.0024** -0.0005 
Rep (j-1)  0.3589***  0.2481***  0.2843***  0.2165***  0.2146*** 
Cash(j)  0.0303***  0.0167***  0.0072**  0.0152***  0.0102*** 
Tobin’s Q(j-1) -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000  -0.0000  0.0002 
Lev(j-1) -0.0007*** -0.0005 -0.0005* -0.0005** -0.0000 
Size(j-1) -0.0002  0.0001**  0.0004***  0.0002*  0.0001 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
 
2234 2234 2234 2234 2234 
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